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1. "It is tempting to pretend that minorities on death row share a fate in no
way connected to our own, that our treatment of them sounds no echoes beyond
the chambers in which they die. Such an illusion is ultimately corrosive, for the
reverberations of injustice are not so easily confined." McCleskey v. Kemp, 481
U.S. 279, 344 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2. The ideas in this article were originally presented at the symposium
entitled "Pursuing Racial Fairness in the Administration of Justice: Twenty
Years After McCleskey v. Kemp," held by the NAACP Legal Defense and
Educational Fund and Columbia Law School on March 2-3, 2007.
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move past McCleskey v. Kemp's framework,3 which fosters the legal
denial of race discrimination in the application of criminal laws in
the United States. Professors Roberts and Thomas offer examples of
the ways in which courts ignore the historical realities of racism in
criminal justice and propose that we educate and re-educate people
about the fundamentals of racial discrimination in the application of
criminal laws.4 Professor Rudovsky offers examples of successful
litigation challenging criminal justice policies and practices that
target African Americans and other people of color living in the
United States.'
The scholarship these authors present has several
overlapping themes. First, racial caste systems still exist in the
United States, and their most common and accepted expression is
through criminal law enforcement. Second, "protection" of white
communities continues to be a central goal of criminal law
enforcement as well as a principal reason for racial discrimination
and other constitutional errors. Third, moving past McCleskey
requires a multi-layered re-education campaign that includes several
inseparable, complementary components: litigation incorporating
historical and social science research, community organizing, and
legal challenges of racial discrimination at all levels of the criminal
justice system. I suggest that these tactics need to snowball and build
on themselves in diverse jurisdictions in order to gain momentum for
a widespread reconsideration of McCleskey.
3. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292-299 (holding that a capital defendant
asserting an equal protection violation under the Fourteenth Amendment must
present evidence of purposeful discrimination in his own case and that statistical
evidence of statewide patterns resulting in racial disparities in death sentencing
was insufficient to establish racial animus and warrant relief).
4. See Kendall Thomas, Nash Professor of Law & Co-Director, Ctr. for
Study of Law & Culture, Columbia Law School, Transforming the Popular
Discourse on Crime, Race, and Rights, Remarks at the NAACP Legal Defense
and Educational Fund and Columbia Law School Symposium: Pursuing Racial
Fairness in the Administration of Justice: Twenty Years After McCleskey v. Kemp
(Mar. 3, 2007); see also Dorothy E. Roberts, Constructing a Criminal Justice
System Free of Racial Bias: An Abolitionist Framework, 39 Colum. Hum. Rts. L.
Rev. 262, 263-67 (2007).
5. See David Rudovsky, Litigating Civil Rights Cases to Reform Racially
Biased Criminal Justice Practices, 39 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 97, 116-19
(2007).
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I. REESTABLISHING THE TRUTH ABOUT HISTORICAL AND
CONTEMPORARY RACISM IN AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Professor Roberts presents a critical reminder of the direct
link between racial subjugation-beginning with slavery, through
Jim Crow, and into the modern era-and unprecedented
incarceration rates and disenfranchisement of black and brown men.
6
She calls for an interdisciplinary approach.7 Her work is a reminder
that the legal framework established by McCleskey, Whren v. United
States,5 and City of Los Angeles v. Lyons,9 among other cases, has
completely divorced the law from the social and historical realities
that have inspired most of our criminal laws and criminal justice
practices. These cases accomplish this result by, on the one hand,
requiring evidence of law enforcement's subjective, intentional
discrimination (McCleskey) or consistent police abuse (Lyons), while
holding, on the other hand, that an officer's subjective intent is
irrelevant in evaluating the constitutionality of a police stop (Whren).
Together, these decisions erect hurdles that render it nearly
impossible to make a legal showing of racial discrimination in
criminal arrests or prosecutions, though common experience and
common sense leave little doubt that race continues to remain as
salient as ever in public attitudes about crime and punishment ° and
6. Roberts, supra note 4, at 268-79.
7. Id. at 267.
8. See generally Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996) (holding that
a police officer's subjective reasons for a traffic stop are not relevant in a case
alleging racial discrimination; rather, the stop's constitutionality must be
considered from a reasonable officer's view of the circumstances prompting the
stop).
9. See generally City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983) (holding
that a plaintiff who was put in a chokehold by police that injured his larynx
lacked standing to seek equitable relief enjoining police from using chokeholds on
citizens because he could not "make the [required] incredible assertion" that all
Los Angeles police always choke any citizen whom they encounter or that the Los
Angeles Police Department maintained a policy ordering or authorizing police to
use chokeholds).
10. See, e.g., Bureau of Justice Statistics, Sourcebook of Criminal Justice
Statistics Online (31st ed.), http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/tost_2.html,
tbl.2.11.2007 (reporting that 51% of African-American respondents surveyed
reported having "very little confidence" in the criminal justice system as
compared to 30% of white respondents); tbl.2.0002.2005 (reporting that 71% of
white respondents reported believing that there was no police brutality in their
area as compared to 29% of African-American respondents who reported so
believing); tbl.2.12.2007 (reporting that 60% of white respondents reported
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in the application of criminal laws." Justice Brennan's dissent in
McCleskey may have marked the last time any Supreme Court
opinion explicitly acknowledged the direct link between a desire to
subjugate African Americans and the architecture of criminal codes
throughout the United States.1
2
History books have consistently documented the intention to
use criminal laws to racially subjugate. For example, Judge A. Leon
Higginbotham's In the Matter of Color'3 and Shades of Freedom4 as
well as David Oshinsky's Worse Than Slavery'5 (which traces the
plantation-to-prison evolution in Mississippi) report the immediate
link between the end of slavery and the establishment of criminal
and penal codes in post-Civil War America. In addition, the media
has reported on law enforcement backlashes when African Americans
appear to gain political or economic strength.' 6 For example, a
documentary entitled Bastards of the Party17 explores the history of
having a great deal of confidence in the police, as compared to 22% of African-
American respondents so reporting).
11. Id. at tbl.5.52.2002, Characteristics of Felony Defendants in the 75
Largest Counties (documenting that in 2002, 31% of felony defendants in the
nation's 75 largest counties were white, 43% were black, and 24% were Hispanic).
12. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 328-35 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (describing a "dual system of crime and punishment" in Georgia from
the colonial period into the twentieth century, which "expressly differentiated
between crimes by and against blacks and whites").
13. See generally A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., In the Matter of Color: Race
& The American Legal Process: The Colonial Period (Oxford University Press
1980) (1978) (describing colonial South Carolinian penal codes that imposed the
death penalty for convicted slaves and, in some circumstances, free black persons
and mandated lesser punishment for whites).
14. See generally A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Shades of Freedom: Racial
Politics and Presumptions of the American Legal Process 50-52 (1996)
(describing colonial-era Virginia statutes that effectively decriminalized the
murder of a slave when committed by a slave master).
15. See generally David M. Oshinsky, Worse than Slavery: Parchman Farm
and the Ordeal of Jim Crow Justice (1996) (documenting the history of Parchman
Farm-Mississippi's infamous prison-including its post-Civil War and post-
emancipation role in providing plantation labor through the leasing of black
convicts to farmers).
16. See Darryl Fears, In Tulsa, Keeping Alive 1921's Painful Memory,
Wash. Post, June 1, 2005, at A3 (describing a reparation lawsuit argued by
Professor Charles Ogletree on behalf of families of victims of the 1921 race riots
in Tulsa, Oklahoma); see also Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Tulsa Reparations: The
Survivors' Story, 24 B.C. Third World L.J. 13, 16-19 (2003) (explaining the
rationale for the Tulsa race riot reparation litigation).
17. Bastards of the Party (HBO 2007).
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African-American gangs, which remain a central target of federal
and state law enforcement, including federal capital prosecutions.
According to the film, modem gangs were formed in response to
vicious Jim Crow-era segregation and racial violence in Los Angeles
in order to protect black neighborhoods from police brutality and
racist attacks. They evolved into the Black Panther Party and
splintered off into smaller factions that began to combat one another
rather than protect their communities as they were founded to do.
This film is a reminder that black neighborhoods in many
cities at one time built their own social service institutions, such as
early childhood education, after school programs, and protective law
enforcement-like entities. These self-help organizations were a threat
to the broader racial order in many communities; as Professor
Anthony Amsterdam described in his opening remarks, they
threatened to disturb the nation's racial "caste system."' 8 Professor
Roberts, too, highlights this point in noting that the most repressive
criminal justice policies often follow periods of civil rights gains that
shake the "white racial hegemony."' 9 She also argues, significantly,
that another particularly pernicious feature of criminal law and the
penal system's marginalization and subjugation of African Americans
is that the more successful the de facto results of those policies are,
the less necessary it is for law enforcement to resort to outright racist
violence and other overt discrimination.2' This allows the legal
system to "push race underground" and, given the McCleskey
framework, renders a legal challenge to prosecution with
unmistakably racist impacts and genesis nearly impossible to
prove.21
18. Anthony G. Amsterdam, University Professor and Professor of Law at
New York University School of Law, Opening Remarks at the NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund and Columbia Law School Symposium: Pursuing
Racial Fairness in the Administration of Justice: Twenty Years After McCleskey
v. Kemp (Mar. 2, 2007), in 39 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 34, 34 (2007).
19. Roberts, supra note 4, at 272 (quoting Alex Lichtenstein's assertion
that incarceration rates of minorities in particular increase after periods of "white
racial hegemony" have ended).
20. Id. at 272.
21. See Kendall Thomas, "If There is Such a Thing" Race, Sex, and the
Politics of Enjoyment in the Killing State (unpublished manuscript, on file with
the author); see also Roberts, supra note 4, at 261; Amsterdam, supra note 18 at
47 (concluding that under McCleskey, statistical data showing racial
differentiation would most likely be insufficient to show a constitutional
violation).
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McCleskey has discouraged practical legal application
(litigation) challenging the unjust historical realities Professor
Roberts so aptly describes. I discuss below that Professors Roberts
and Thomas sound a compelling alarm to litigators and policymakers
to reawaken America to the reality of racism in the criminal justice
system by pleading it, arguing it, and documenting it in court. As
legal advocates, we must build a record of the inescapable historical
facts of racism in the application of criminal laws via amicus briefs
and building factual records in criminal and civil cases, like the ones
Professor Rudovsky describes.2 2 We must bolster legal efforts by
shoring up public recognition of the problem through news stories,
books, film, and other means of educating policymakers and their
constituents that our criminal justice policies are by design, and not
by accident, devastating communities of color.
This kind of public education campaign is also indispensable
to remind voters and prospective jurors about the crucial importance
of exercising their rights to hold elected officials, including
prosecutors, accountable for their choices of which cases to prosecute.
Professor Roberts directs us to notice that the maintenance of mass
incarceration policies, the administration of the death penalty, and
the infliction of police terror is in part attributable to the
disenfranchisement of targeted communities. 23  Any successful
advocacy must re-engage these communities and show politicians
that criminal justice reform is no longer a liability, but actually a
requirement of service to their constituents.
Professor Roberts also urges accountability for police
misconduct.24 The legal and policy shields that protect police after
they shoot unarmed citizens are one specific target for reform.25
Many litigators arguing civil rights cases have represented clients
22. Rudovsky, supra note 5, at 102-105 (describing civil litigation in New
Jersey and Philadelphia, as well as a study by the New York State Attorney
General, all documenting racial disparities in police stops of civilians).
23. Roberts, supra note 4, at 281-83.
24. Id. at 284-86.
25. See Peter Neufeld, Op-Ed., Ask a Policeman, N.Y. Times, Dec. 24, 2006,
§ 4, at 8 (criticizing New York prosecutors' policy of shielding police from
investigative interviews after they are implicated in shooting even unarmed
suspects); see also Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 Iowa L. Rev. 1107, 1112-
16, 1162-63 (2000) (describing the impact of police brutality and misconduct on
the community's trust of police, and proposing information-sharing policies to
enhance the efficacy of law enforcement practices).
2007]
130 COLUMBIA HUMAN RIGHTS LAW REVIEW [39:124
who were terrorized or tricked by police before "confessing" to crimes;
many times interrogations are peppered with racial epithets and/or
threats of capital prosecution.26 Reform of interrogation techniques is
one place to start. It can effectively increase the cost to police of their
use of certain interrogation tactics, encouraging changes such as the
suppression of incriminating statements wrought as a result of police
misrepresentation of, for example, the presence of evidence
incriminating the suspect.2 7
If Professor Roberts' recounting of the historical and
contemporary realities of racism in American criminal law lays a
bedrock foundation for building a framework for challenging
McCleskey, Professor Thomas pushes for excavating beneath that
foundation by "first free[ing ourselves] of the law"28 and deepening
the recent scholarly interest in the cultural roots of the death
penalty's application in the United States.29 Professor Thomas' article
brings to mind Professor Charles Lawrence's groundbreaking piece
describing the power of unconscious racism.30 Professor Thomas'
article can be read as calling readers to look for, recognize, and
document "Unconscious Racism, Plus." This is particularly important
at a time when, as he reminds us, courts, policymakers, and in many
respects, popular culture are operating as though we are in a "post-
racial" era, in which nothing but the most blatant, Jim Crow-style
26. See, e.g., Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False
Confessions in the Post-DNA World, 82 N.C.L. Rev. 891, 907-23 (2004)
(describing social psychology of police interrogation techniques leading to false
confessions); Welsh S. White, Confessions in Capital Cases, 2003 U. Ill. L. Rev.
979, 1008-1014 (discussing the coercive impact on murder suspects of threats of
capital prosecution and describing illustrative cases involving suspects who
falsely confessed after being threatened with the death penalty); Richard J. Ofshe
& Richard A. Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice and Irrational
Action, 74 Deny. U. L. Rev. 979, 985-1000 (1997) (describing interrogation
techniques leading to false confessions).
27. See, e.g., Miriam S. Gohara, A Lie for a Lie: False Confessions and the
Case for Reconsidering Deceptive Interrogation Techniques, 33 Fordham Urb. L.J.
791, 834-40 (2006) (advocating for policy reform and legal challenges to deceptive
interrogation tactics).
28. Thomas, supra note 21, at 9.
29. Thomas, supra note 4.
30. See generally Charles R. Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 Stan. L. Rev. 317 (1987)
(objecting to the requirement set forth in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229
(1976), that challenges to facially neutral laws with discriminatory impacts
require a showing of discriminatory intent and purpose).
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bigotry establishes that criminal justice practices in the United
States have been overwhelmingly racially biased. As Professor
Roberts writes, in many instances these practices were designed to
subjugate African Americans, and have resulted in staggering rates
of incarceration of black men.3 Professor Thomas urges that we learn
to look for ways to think about the relationship of race/racism and
capital punishment in this "post-racial" state.
A fact illustrating Professor Thomas' point is that the next
six people who are slated to be executed by the United States are
black men. 32 The first three to have been executed in 2001 and 2002
were a white man (Timothy McVeigh), a black man, and a Latino
man.33 When the Department of Justice under former United States
Attorney General Janet Reno issued a report finding "disturbing"
statistics that pointed to imbalanced application of federal capital
prosecutions, which resulted in disproportionate conviction and
death sentences of African Americans,3 4 former Attorney General
John Ashcroft released his own study, purporting to rebut the Reno
findings and concluding that no racial discrimination exists in
federal capital prosecutions.35 The Department of Justice, moreover,
took steps to bolster this impression. First under Ashcroft's direction
and then under that of former Attorney General Alberto Gonzales,
the Department centralized federal death prosecutions to an
31. Roberts, supra 4, at 263-64.
32. The Federal Capital Habeas Project monitors the case status of every
prisoner sentenced to death by the United States. According to the Project, the
next six people slated for execution are James Roane, Richard Tipton, Cory
Johnson, Anthony Battle, Orlando Hall, and Bruce Webster. All are African
American. Deborah Fins, NAACP LDF, Death Row U.S.A. 63 (2007), available at
http://www.naacpldf.org/content/pdf/pubs/drusa/DRUSAWinter_2007.pdf.
33. Death Penalty Info. Ctr., Federal Executions 1927-2003, http://www.
deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=29&did=149 (last visited Sept. 12, 2007).
34. U.S. Dep't of Justice, The Federal Death Penalty System: A Statistical
Survey (1988-2000) (Sept. 12, 2000), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/
pubdoc/dpsurvey.html. Commenting on the report, Attorney General Reno said
that she was "sorely troubled" by its findings of racial disparities in the
application of the federal death penalty, and Deputy Attorney General Eric
Holder said that he was "personally and professionally disturbed." Marc Lacey &
Raymond Bonner, Reno Troubled by Death Penalty Statistics, N.Y. Times, Sept.
13, 2000, at A17.
35. U.S. Dep't of Justice, The Federal Death Penalty System:
Supplementary Data, Analysis and Revised Protocols for Capital Case Review, 14
Fed. Sent'g Rep. 40, 40-41 (June 6, 2001), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/
pubdo/deathpenaltystudy.htm.
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unprecedented degree. 6 It has prosecuted a number of cases
involving alleged white supremacists, 37 as well as Russian 38 and a
few Italian 39 mafia members. This expansion of federal death, even
into federal courts in jurisdictions that have consistently turned
away from the death penalty, such as Massachusetts,4 ° Vermont,4'
and North Dakota,42 has been in a purported effort to apply the death
penalty in a more even-handed and less geographically concentrated
manner.
The symbolism of prosecuting a member of the Aryan
Brotherhood, in particular, is likely calculated to help distract from
36. See generally John Gleeson, Supervising Federal Capital Punishment:
Why the Attorney General Should Defer When U.S. Attorneys Recommend Against
the Death Penalty, 89 Va. L. Rev. 1697 (2003) (describing the uniformity required
by Department of Justice in death penalty prosecutions); see also David Hechler,
U.S. Death Penalty in Wake of Ashcroft: Will Gonzales Loosen AG's Grip?, Nat'l L.
J., Nov. 29, 2004, at 1 (discussing whether Gonzales will continue "Ashcroft's
aggressive approach" to federal death prosecutions); William Glaberson, Capital
Cases and Agendas: Ashcroft Sets a Tone on the Death Penalty, N.Y. Times, Feb.
8, 2003, at B1 (describing Attorney General Ashcroft's high degree of control over
death penalty cases).
37. See Prison Aryans Are Sentenced to Life Terms, N.Y. Times, Nov. 22,
2006, at A24 (reporting that Aryan Brotherhood members Barry B. Mills and
Tyler D. Bingham "received consecutive life terms without possibility of parole,"
notwithstanding prosecutors' arguments for the death penalty); see also Press
Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Leaders of Aryan Brotherhood's Federal Faction
Convicted of Racketeering and Murder Offenses (Sept. 15, 2006),
http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/cac/news/pr2006/121.html (describing prosecutions of
Mills and Bingham and related Aryan Brotherhood members, including 18 guilty
pleas, 4 convictions, and 14 additional defendants awaiting trial).
38. See Joe Mozingo, Jury Votes Death for 2 in Killings, L.A. Times, Feb.
14, 2007, at B3 (reporting death sentences awarded in federal prosecution of Iouri
Mikhel and Jurijus Kadamovas, two alleged members of Russian mob).
39. See Michael Brick, U.S. to Seek Death Penalty for a Reputed Crime
Boss, N.Y. Times, Apr. 3, 2007, at B5 (reporting on federal death prosecution of
"Vinny Gorgeous" in New York).
40. See United States v. Sampson, 300 F. Supp. 2d 278, 281 (D. Mass.
2004) (deciding the appropriate venue for Gary Sampson's execution and noting
that the execution cannot be carried out in 'Massachusetts, though the crimes
took place there, because Massachusetts law "does not provide the death penalty
for any offense").
41. See Death Penalty Info. Ctr., The Federal Death Penalty,
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/article.php?scid=29&did=147 (last visited Sept.
17, 2007) (listing Vermont as one of the non-death penalty states in which the
United States pursued capital prosecution of a crime that resulted in a federal
capital sentence).
42. Id. (listing North Dakota).
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the historical racism of the death penalty and sanitize the
contemporary racism of its administration. Prosecuting a handful of
high-profile cases involving particularly unsavory white defendants
may be an attempt to offer a foil to allegations that the federal death
penalty is racist in its application. This is an example of a tactic that
might be supposed to persuade people that the federal death penalty
has entered the "post-racial" era that Professor Thomas describes.
The fact is, of course, that no amount of death penalty expansion can
undo its history, its purpose, and its legacy. 3 No perpetuation of
injustice to new groups has worked to restore justice to historically
targeted groups.
Professor Thomas also encourages us to think about ways in
which race, though not explicitly expressed in capital cases, is
nevertheless present through the marginalization of another set of
social characteristics, such as sexual orientation or gender." The
concept of the "social imaginary" is important to understanding
Professor Thomas' challenge for overcoming McCleskey. It denotes
understanding "the ways in which people imagine 'their social
existence, how they fit together with others . . . and the deeper
normative notions and images that underlie these expectations.' 45 As
Professor Amsterdam mentioned during his remarks, this is in
keeping with Emile Durkheim and Gunnar Myrdal's observations
that the severity of criminal punishment in America is directly
related to the caste of the alleged perpetrator and the alleged
victim.
4 6
I offer an illustration from one of my own cases. I represent
an African-American man convicted of the capital murder of a white
man.4 1 My client was tried for capital murder before a Mobile,
43. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 328-29, 332 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) ("Evaluation of McCleskey's evidence cannot rest solely on the
numbers themselves. We must also ask whether the conclusion suggested by
those numbers is consonant with our understanding of history and human
experience. Georgia's legacy of a race-conscious criminal justice system, as well as
this Court's own recognition of the persistent danger that racial attitudes may
affect criminal proceedings, indicates that McCleskey's claim is not a fanciful
product of mere statistical artifice .... [Ilt would be unrealistic to ignore the
influence of history in assessing the plausible implications of McCleskey's
evidence.").
44. See Thomas, supra note 21, at 7-8.
45. Id. at 10.
46. Amsterdam, supra note 18, at 39.
47. Williams v. State, 782 So. 2d 811, 816 (Ala. Crim. App. 2000).
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Alabama trial court judge, who was appointed to the bench by George
Wallace, Alabama's governor, who was famous for declaring:
"Segregation now . segregation tomorrow . . segregation
forever."48 In an unrelated case, a bar complaint was filed against the
same judge for advising a young defense lawyer not to work so hard
to get bail on behalf of his clients because "we need more niggers in
jail."49 Despite litigation pointing to evidence of the judge's bias
against our client and his witnesses, so far no reviewing court has
been willing to upset our client's death sentence or even to conduct
its own evidentiary hearing on some of the constitutional issues
presented in post-conviction litigation.5 °
Cases like this come to mind in reference to what Professor
Thomas describes as the perceived intrusion of
minority/disenfranchised/subjugated groups on the "racial
enjoyment" of the majority.5' Professor Thomas also posits that "the
'death penalty imaginary' imbues the 'good' citizens with a sense of'
what Kenneth Karst has termed "belonging to America."52 This sense
of enjoyment was perhaps most crudely expressed in the celebrations
and picnics that often occurred at the public lynchings throughout
the first half of the last century.53 Professor Thomas urges that we
collectively ask: "What does the practice of capital punishment do for
(some of) us?"5 4 How does it make us feel safe and protected? How
does it cement our status as belonging among the "good citizens"?
Asking this question is crucial in finding strategies to reverse the
attractiveness of capital punishment and other racially
discriminatory criminal justice policies to policymakers, their
constituents, jurors, and judges.
48. George C. Wallace, Inaugural Address (Jan. 14, 1963), in Black, White,
and Gray: Twenty-one Points of View on the Race Question 177, 180 (Bradford
Daniel ed., 1964).
49. Ken Silverstein, The Judge as Lynch Mob, Am. Prospect, May 7, 2001,
at 26, 27.
50. See generally Williams v. Haley, No. 01-0777-CB-C (S.D. Ala. filed Oct.
30, 2006) (denying petition for habeas relief).
51. Id. at 18, 22 (emphasis added) (quoting Dylan Evans).
52. Id. at 26 (quoting Kenneth Karst).
53. See Leon F. Litwack, Hellhounds, in Without Sanctuary: Lynching
Photography in America 8, 8-26 (James Allen et al., 2003) (describing how
lynchings often became public spectacles that attracted large numbers of
enthusiastic spectators and assumed a "carnival-like atmosphere").
54. Thomas, supra note 21, at 28.
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II. WHAT HAS WORKED: SUCCESSFUL RACE-BASED LITIGATION
Professors Roberts and Thomas have provided the historical
background and methodology necessary for challenging publicly the
confines of "post-racial" discourse. This foundation is crucial for
developing litigation and complementary strategies that will undo
McCleskey's legal framework. Professor Rudovsky offers some "where
the rubber hits the road" instruction about the litigation that has
challenged racial discrimination in the application of criminal laws.55
He reminds readers that litigants have enjoyed some success by
framing non-capital cases as presenting racial discrimination at the
criminal justice system's "point of entry," such as civil lawsuits that
challenge police practices. 6 This type of litigation succeeds,
moreover, despite myriad procedural obstacles presented by
McCleskey, Lyons, and Whren 7 Such barriers include governing
"substantive constitutional standards that fail to address racial bias
and other documented unfair practices in the criminal justice
58feealeiltvons
system", federal legislative limits on remedies such as those
established in the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
59
and the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 60 and "door closing" laws that
"strip[ ] the courts of the power to review certain practices or policies,
or that limit[ I the remedies that may be considered for proven
violations ... such as limitations on standing, immunities, exceptions
to the exclusionary rule, and federalism principles" that warrants
federal court deference to state court factual determinations and
legal conclusions.6'
One of the likely reasons that "point of entry" legal
challenges have succeeded despite these formidable barriers is that
the challenges were publicly sponsored and undertaken, either as a
result of legislative action or court-ordered consent decrees.
55. Rudovsky, supra note 5, at 106-19 (describing civil litigation's potential
to deter racial profiling and citing examples of successful civil litigation).
56. Id. at 100.
57. Id. at 97-99, 106-08, 114-17.
58. Id. at 98.
59. Id. (citing Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) of
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 8, 18, 28 & 42 U.S.C. (2006))).
60. Id. at 98-99 (citing Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) of 1995, Pub.
L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 11, 18, 28 & 42 U.S.C. (2006))).
61. Id. at 98, n.4.
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Furthermore, legal challenges have relied on full factual reports in
which law enforcement officers described their reasons for conducting
stops and searches.62 Where officers failed to record this data,
government reports noted the failure and reported it as a problem.
Data collection has thus emerged as a key element of the success of
these legal challenges to racial profiling.
Also significant to the success of "point of entry" litigation is
that it is not hampered by the independent action of different
decision-makers, as was the case in McCleskey, where capital
prosecutors' and juries' independent choices foiled the Fourteenth
Amendment claim.63 Racial profiling suits succeed even though they
challenge the actions of individual state actors. As Professor
Rudovsky reports, as long as the officers whose behavior is the
subject of the lawsuit are working for the same agency and there is
evidence of that agency's repeated targeting of racial minorities, a
legally sufficient Fourteenth Amendment claim can be established,
as has occurred in some cases.6 "Stop and search" data, for instance,
satisfy the requirement established in United States v. Armstrong
that plaintiffs point to similarly situated white people who are not
subject to the challenged practices.65 Professor Rudovsky reminds us
that where racial profiling is based on an expressly race-conscious
policy, there should be no need for a comparison to similarly situated
non-minority people. Moreover, as an example of another policy that
makes legal challenges to police racial profiling easier to win than
challenges to alleged selective prosecution, Professor Rudovsky
points to the fact that police are not afforded the same presumption
of correctness that prosecutors are.66
Professor Rudovsky's discussion of the "point of entry"
lawsuits brings to mind the Thomas v. City of Gulfport litigation that
the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. (LDF)
undertook in partnership with the Southern Center for Human
62. See id. at 102 (explaining that litigants challenging racial profiling in
common police practices have provided documentation as to the scope of the
problem).
63. McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 297 (1987).
64. See Rudovsky, supra note 5, at 110-12.
65. See id. at 111; United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 465 (1996).
66. Rudovsky, supra note 5, at 112.
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Rights (SCHR).67 Also a "point of entry" lawsuit, the focus in Thomas
was more explicitly on economic bias than on racial bias, though one
of the allegations in the complaint was that police targeted African-
American neighborhoods in search of people unable to pay "old fines,"
who were then subject to arrest for that reason alone.68 The Thomas
lawsuit shares in common with Professor Rudovsky's examples of
"point of entry" suits its underscoring of the plight of a relatively
sympathetic group of people. They were not charged with serious,
much less capital, crimes. Rather, the plaintiffs were charged with
crimes such as public drunkenness and riding a bike without a light
and were unable to afford their fines. They were then taken back to
court, unrepresented by counsel, and jailed essentially for being
poor.69 Seeing the impact of capricious law enforcement practices
through the eyes of a "sympathetic" group may be a gateway to
highlighting the inefficiency and injustice of policies that depend on
generalizations or racial stereotypes. Also, as with racial profiling
67. See Complaint, Thomas v. City of Gulfport, No 1:05-CV-349-LG-RHW
(S.D. Miss. July 2005), available at http://www.naacpldf.org/content/pdf/gulfport
Thomas v._Cityof Gulfport.pdf [hereinafter Complaint].
68. The Complaint alleged: "The City of Gulfport employs a special force of
police officers charged with trolling the streets of Gulfport to round up citizens
who have failed to pay fines assessed by the Gulfport Municipal Court. These
officers conduct periodic sweeps, during which they search the streets for people
who look as though they might owe the City old fines. During these sweeps, the
officers go to predominately African-American neighborhoods and stop people in
the streets without any legitimate reason, but for the sole purpose of checking to
see if they owe the City old fines. Those who owe fines are taken to jail." Id. 91 2.
The Complaint also pled debtor's prison allegations, including some of the
following: violations of right to counsel under Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25,
37 (1972) (holding that, "absent a knowing and intelligent waiver," a court may
not imprison an individual for any offene-whether "petty, misdemeanor or
felony"-when the individual did not receive legal representation at trial), and
Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 658 (2002) (holding that the court cannot
impose a suspended sentence that may actually result in deprivation of the
defendant's liberty unless defendant received legal representation at trial);
violations of defendants' constitutional rights under Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S.
660, 672 (1983) (holding that "in revocation proceedings for failure to pay a fine,"
the court must examine whether the failure to pay was willful before seeking
imprisonment for the probationer), and Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395, 398 (1971)
(finding that the "Constitution prohibits the State from imposing a fine as a
sentence and then automatically converting it into a jail term solely because the
defendant is indigent and cannot forthwith pay the fine in full") (quoting Morris
v. Schoonfield, 399 U.S. 508, 509 (1970) (per curiam)).
69. See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 67, 91 22, 58.
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lawsuits, when law enforcement practices like "sweeps" ° that depend
on generalizing characteristics of certain communities (racial,
economic, etc.) are exposed as wasting money that could be spent
protecting communities from real danger, public policy reforms of
such practices are likely to follow.
Thomas v. City of Gulfport and "point of entry" suits echo
Professor Rudovsky's observation about innocence: he instructs that
correcting the flawed criminal justice practices unearthed by
wrongful convictions will effect reforms that will necessarily reduce
the impact of bad criminal justice policies on black and brown
communities because they bear most of the brunt of law enforcement
practices that lead to wrongful convictions.7' Indeed, "point of entry"
lawsuits foster the perception that the targeted people are innocent
of wrongdoing. Nicknames for the lawsuits like "Driving While
Black" or "Flying While Arab or Asian" highlight the perception that
the plaintiffs have done nothing wrong and have just been racial
minorities in the wrong place at the wrong time.
The plaintiffs in these innocence suits often have not been
convicted of any crime, or they have been accused or convicted of a
very minor violation. People can thus put themselves in the plaintiffs'
shoes. Moreover, on a less conscious or explicit level, the more we
highlight the plight of the innocent person, targeted in part because
he fit the "profile," the more likely we are to diminish the notion that
criminal defendants generally-a disproportionate number of whom
are black men-are dangerous and that even if they are not guilty of
this, they are probably guilty of something.
Revealing the racist underpinnings of the entire system,
starting with police stops all the way through capital prosecutions,
will require increased information sharing, attention to such
phenomena as "protecting" white communities (discussed further,
infra), as well as suits to stop discriminatory law enforcement. Data
collected as a result of racial profiling suits in particular jurisdictions
can be used to raise Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment challenges
to capital prosecutions in those jurisdictions. This multi-layered
approach is a way of developing the deeper historical and social
context necessary to rebut the "post-racial" legal and policy
70. By "sweeps," I am referring to mass arrests targeting communities or
neighborhoods supposed to be the site of particular criminal activity.
71. Rudovsky, supra note 5, at 120-123.
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framework civil rights and criminal defense lawyers have been forced
to reckon with since McCleskey.
Protecting white communities is also a goal of many law
enforcement policies. As Professor Roberts writes, racist law
enforcement follows periods of civil rights gains that are perceived as
a threat to white racial hegemony.72 Several studies have shown that
pursuing the protection of white communities at all costs leads to
higher rates of error as well as to racial discrimination in criminal
cases. For example, Professor Rudovsky notes that the statistics
revealed by a study of police pedestrian and car stops in white areas
of Philadelphia7 3 showed "hugely disproportionate stops by race,"
while stops in predominantly African-American parts of the city were
"roughly proportionate to the population in those areas."74 The same
disparity was evident in the New York Attorney General's 1999 study
of police stops. 75 Professor Rudovsky reports that the New York study
showed that racial disparities in stop rates are particularly
pronounced in parts of the city where the majority of the population
is white.76 In precincts where African Americans represented 10% or
less of the population and whites represented 80% or more of the
population, African Americans accounted for 30% of the stops during
the investigated period.77 The study also documented that arrest
rates based on stops differed by race, with black and Latino people
less likely than whites to be arrested once they were stopped: police
stopped 9.5 black people for each stop that resulted in an arrest; 8.8
Latinos; yet only 7.9 whites per arrest. 7' These arrest data strongly
suggests that racial discrimination reported in the study is not a
product of crime rates, allocation of police resources, or other factors
that may have impacted the data on stops.
72. Roberts, supra note 4, at 273.
73. Rudovsky, supra note 5, at 104 (citing Plaintiffs' Fifth Monitoring
Report, Pedestrian and Car Stop Audit, NAACP v. City of Philadelphia, No. 96-
CV-6045 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 7, 2000)).
74. Id. at 23-28.
75. Civil Rights Bureau, Office of Att'y Gen. of the State of N.Y., The New
York City Police Department's "Stop & Frisk" Practices: A Report to the People of
the State of New York From The Office Of The Attorney General 88-89 (Dec. 1
1999), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/reports/stop-frisk/stop-frisk.
html) [hereinafter "Stop & Frisk" Practices].
76. Rudovsky, supra note 5, at 104-05.
77. Id. at 105.
78. "Stop & Frisk" Practices, supra note 75, at 111.
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Similarly, another problem to be exposed (on the opposite end
of the criminal justice spectrum) is one of the findings in Professors
Liebman, Fagan, and West's "Broken System" study: that a factor
contributing to a high error rate in capital cases is the over-use by
jurisdictions of the death penalty even for prosecuting crimes that
were not the worst of the worst.79 The researchers found that some of
the conditions that pressured counties and states to overuse the
death penalty-and thus resulted in an increased risk of erroneous
convictions and sentences-were race, politics, and poor law
enforcement. 80 The study made two findings with regard to race as a
factor in wrongful capital conviction. First, "[tihe closer the homicide
risk to whites in a state comes to equalling or surpassing the risk to
blacks, the higher the error rate."8' The authors found that reversal
rates in capital cases were twice as high in areas where homicides
more heavily affected whites (compared to blacks) than where they
more heavily affected blacks.82
Second, there was a direct correlation between the proportion
of African Americans in a state, and in one study a direct correlation
between the number of welfare recipients in a state, and the rate of
serious capital error.83 As Professors Liebman, Fagan, and West
explained, "[blecause this effect has to do with traits of the
population at large, not those of particular trial participants, it
appears to be an indicator of crime fears driven by racial and
economic conditions."84 Indeed, the authors more explicitly concluded
that "when whites and other influential citizens feel threatened by
homicide, they put pressure on officials to punish as many criminals
as severely as possible," which results in mistaken capital convictions
of people who are later found to have committed a less serious crime
or to be completely innocent.8 These findings in cases ranging from
"stop and frisk" encounters to capital prosecutions strongly suggest
79. See James S. Liebman et al., A Broken System Part II: Why There Is
So Much Error in Capital Cases, and What Can Be Done About It, ii (2002),
available at http://www2.1aw.columbia.edu/brokensystem2/report.pdf.





85. A Broken System, Part II: Questions About the Study, http://www.
thejusticeproject.org/press/reports/a-broken-system-part-ii-qa.html (last visited
Sept. 30, 2007).
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that the racial considerations at play in McCleskey are still actively
informing application of criminal laws at all levels of law
enforcement.
III. CONCLUSION: PROPOSED STRATEGIES FOR MOVING PAST
MCCLESKEY
This Symposium was convened to consider ways in which the
truth can be exposed about the continuing influence of race in
criminal prosecution and punishment and to propose measures for
combating this racism. The following is my proposal for a strategy
going forward. First, I propose that civil rights litigators undertake a
thorough re-education of policymakers and grassroots constituents
about what they already know: race matters in the criminal justice
system. It pervades and drives our criminal laws, from the most
minor violations to the ultimate penalty. The re-education campaign
must include social science research and popular culture. It must
infuse litigation with evidence of the real-life circumstances of racial
discrimination, both historical and contemporary, in the jurisdictions
in which legal challenges are brought.
Second, as demonstrated by the racial profiling "point-of-
entry" litigation context, data collection of all kinds is key: statistical
studies, sentencing data, jury composition data, and policy-and-
practice documentation from police and prosecutors. To that we
should add depositions and affidavits from former prosecutors, police,
residents, and leaders of the impacted communities as well as
historians and others who can "give life" to statistics demonstrating
racial disparities in the targeted jurisdictions.
Putting this kind of information into the official record of a
tribunal matters. It creates a precedential history, even if we do not
win every case in which we raise these issues. This kind of record
builds on itself over time and starts to chip away at the "post-racial"
illusion that courts have succeeded in creating for at least the last
two decades since McCleskey.
Finally, litigation strategies should be distributed through
different layers of the justice system: cities, counties, states, and the
federal government. They should include examination of each level of
the criminal justice system, from stops and searches, misdemeanor
cases, and bail practices all the way to capital prosecutions and
sentences. These litigation strategies must include partners in social
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science, history, and people with thorough local knowledge of the
relevant communities. As Professor Amsterdam advised during his
opening remarks, organizing the community around these efforts is
critical. 6 It will help drive the recomposition of juries, push elected
officials to be accountable to the communities most devastated by
racist criminal justice policies, and expose the kinds of racism about
which people must be re-educated.
Litigation strategies must be flanked by complementary
approaches. We have to deepen our efforts in education, so that no
single excuse or proxy can continue to deny the pervasive relevance
of race in punishment, and so that no one can with a straight face
continue to pretend-despite all common-sense and evidence to the
contrary-that absent a documented intention to prosecute on the
basis of race, our justice system is colorblind.
86. Amsterdam, supra note 18, at 50-52.
